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Board task-related faultlines and firm performance: A decade of evidence  
 
ABSTRACT 
Manuscript Type: Empirical 
Research Question/ Issue: To what extent can group faultlines and their potential value-
destroying effects be detected on corporate boards? Task-related attributes of the type of 
directorship, education, board tenure and financial background of board members are considered 
as directors’ characteristics that give rise to the faultline phenomenon. The impact of task-related 
faultlines on firm performance as well as the moderating effects of busy boards, Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) tenure, executive directors’ (EDs) compensation structure, and the average non-
executive directors’ (NEDs) involvement in board committees are examined.    
Research Findings/ Insights: Using a panel of FTSE 350 companies from 1999 to 2008, we 
find a strong negative effect of task-related faultlines on firm performance. Further exploration 
of the moderating effects demonstrates that the condition of a busy board and the CEO tenure 
exacerbate the negative effects of faultlines. At the same time, the executive pay-contingency is 
found to have a remedying effect on boardroom cohesiveness, whereas the involvement of NEDs 
in board committee work is not likely to make the adverse effects of board faultlines less 
pronounced.  
Theoretical/ Academic Implications: Based on the arguments of the identity and social identity 
theory, this study shows that task-related faultlines on corporate boards have strong negative 
value-creating implications. The positive moderating impact of the executive compensation 
structure renders support to agency theory predictions about executive incentive alignment. This 
work also underlines the usefulness of the concept of faultlines in the corporate governance 
literature, because the unitary boards, where NEDs and EDs come to work together, exhibit pre-
existing factions, similar to top management teams of family-controlled firms and teams 
managing international joint-ventures.  
Practitioner/Policy Implications: This research points to the importance of the careful selection 
process of directors by the nomination committees. It also underlines the role for active 
leadership on boards, who should be aware of available strategies to ameliorate the negative 
consequences of board splits, such as accentuating superordinate board identity and/ or informal 


















 The board of directors as a means of shareholders’ indirect control has received 
considerable attention in academic research on corporate governance, which has been maturing 
as an autonomous research field in the last twenty years (Durisin and Puzone, 2009). At the same 
time, the literature on the concept of faultline signifying team splits has been growing since the 
publication of the pioneering work by Lau and Murnighan (1998), however it still remains little 
utilised compared to the notion of diversity in research on team effectiveness in general, and in 
corporate governance and board research in particular (Mathieu, Maynard, Rapp, and Gilson, 
2008). For this reason, we apply the concept of faultlines from the group effectiveness literature 
to the study of board composition and dynamics with the underlying question of value-
destroying implications of board schism.  
While studies of board characteristics represent one of the most popular areas of corporate 
governance research (Durisin and Puzone, 2009), there is still relatively little attention to the 
dynamics of actually how such groups work (Huse, 2007; Leblanc and Gillies, 2005; Pye, 2002) 
or potential solutions when dynamics break down. The concept of faultlines, capturing the 
emergence of distinct sub-groups in a team and hence decrease in cohesiveness, enables the 
examination of consequences of such board processual shortcomings. Like its geological 
forebear, it refers to the potential for schism which may arise from alignment along one or more 
dimensions amongst members of a group, such as social category (e.g. age, gender) or deep-level 
attributes (e.g. values, experience), that gives rise to subgroup emergence. It is a factor common 
to group settings everywhere in the world although interestingly, there appears to be a dearth of 
literature which brings faultline analysis to the board context, hence this is the focus of our study. 
In this work, we examine the phenomenon of task-related faultlines on the boards of UK 
largest listed companies across the time span of 1999-2008. We chose to concentrate on task-
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related attributes because they are context-relevant, which increases the likelihood that such 
faultlines will be activated. We find strong evidence that such board schisms are negatively 
correlated with firm performance. Moreover, faultlines on boards with the majority of directors 
holding multiple directorships at other companies and with long-tenured CEOs are found likely 
to be even more detrimental for firm value-creation. Finally, we report that increasing the ratio of 
performance-related remuneration to overall compensation for executive directors (EDs) is likely 
to have a remedying effect in a board setting affected by board schisms.  
Our findings have relevance for both theory and practice of corporate governance. The 
concept of faultlines from group effectiveness literature appears a useful tool in analyzing board 
composition and dynamics. This is especially the case because unitary UK boards bear features 
of a team with pre-existing factions, similar to the top management team (TMT) of family-
controlled firms or teams managing international joint-ventures. The ameliorating impact of 
EDs’ incentive alignment on boardroom cohesiveness provides validation to the predictions of 
agency theory. The managerial implications of our findings suggest that nomination committees 
should pay attention to the distribution of board members’ attributes on the entire board and be 
wary of the potential for faultline formation. Board leadership should also be aware of potential 
strategies available to curb the negative consequences of board faultlines, such as accentuating 
the superordinate board identity, and including informal meetings as a means of restoring board 
cohesiveness.    
BOARDS AND THE GROUP FAULTLINE PHENOMENON  
Board faultlines 
 Recent reviews or meta-analytical studies of team diversity demonstrate mixed, either 
positive, negative, or no direct effects of diversity on team performance (Jackson, Joshi and 
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Erhardt, 2003; Webber and Donahue, 2001; Williams and O’Reilly, 1998). Among the suggested 
lines for future research there is an idea of more precise conceptualization and measurement of 
the phenomenon of diversity. Harrison and Klein (2007) proposed three ways of capturing 
diversity as ‘separation’, ‘variety’ and ‘disparity’. Whereas the majority of work on diversity has 
been based on measuring diversity as variety, recent advancement in the literature, i.e. the 
concept of group faultlines, opens up the possibility of studying diversity as separation, in which 
splits into subgroups in a team emerge based on the group members’ characteristics (Harrison 
and Klein, 2007; Nielsen, 2010; Van Knippenberg and Schippers, 2007). In a recent review of 
team effectiveness, Mathieu et al. (2008) underlined that faultlines remain little utilized 
compared with other compositional measures, despite the promise they hold for uncovering the 
dynamics that may arise from composition differences among team members.  
 Group faultlines are defined as hypothetical dividing lines that split a group into 
relatively homogeneous sub-groups based on group members’ alignment along their multiple 
attributes (Bezrukova, Jehn, Zanutto, and Thatcher, 2009; Lau and Murnighan, 1998, 2005) and 
are most likely to emerge when the group diversity is moderate (Lau and Murnighan, 1998; 
Earley and Mosakowski, 2000; Webber and Donahue, 2001). The concept of faultlines is based 
on the alignment approach, which assumes a simultaneous alignment of multiple characteristics 
across unit members. For example, a board may split into non-executive directors (NEDs) 
holding a Master’s degree with over 6 years board tenure and lacking a financial background on 
the one hand, and EDs holding a Bachelor degree with less than 3 years board tenure and an 
educational or professional financial background, on the other. Thanks to the notion of faultlines 
in this case we are able to capture the simultaneous alignment of directors’ characteristics of type 
of directorship, education level, board tenure and educational/ professional financial background 
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into two sub-groups on the board. Application of the concept of faultlines therefore allows 
researchers to account for interdependence of attributes of group members and to explain 
variance that is typically not accounted for in studies based on diversity as variety (Bezrukova, 
Thatcher and Jehn, 2007).  
UK companies are commonly characterised by a unitary board structure in which NEDs 
work together with EDs, shaping the strategic direction and control of the company. NEDs are 
usually part time, do not have executive responsibility, are independent from the company and 
typically constitute at least half of the board excluding the Chairperson in FTSE 350 companies 
(provision A 3.2 of the UK Combined Code, 2008, which is further continued as provision B 1.2 
in the UK Corporate Governance Code, 2010). In contrast, EDs have a full-time contract with the 
company and hold executive responsibility. Thus, even in their basic constitution, boards 
potentially have an extant faultline akin to other factional groups found, for example, in teams 
managing international joint ventures (Hambrick, Li, Xin and Tsui, 2001; Li and Hambrick, 
2005).  
There are other examples of teams that have pre-existing faultlines akin to the idea proposed 
by Li and Hambrick (2005). For example, Minichilli, Corbetta and MacMillan (2010) find that 
TMTs of family-owned firms divide into family and non-family members groupings, which are 
essentially factional. This is because the former typically share common culture, values and 
norms inherited from their parents and relatives as well as a common pattern of education and 
stronger emotional attachment to the firm, whereas the latter generally share similar external 
professional experiences to those of family members, however possess a common feeling of 
exclusion from the controlling family. In similar vein, Polzer, Crisp, Jarvenpaa and Kim (2006) 
put forward an idea that groups based on geographically co-located sub-groups are another 
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example of a team with pre-existing factions, whereby the demarcation line goes between those 
sub-groups that can meet face-to-face because they are physically present. So, boards of directors 
represent a similar kind of team/group situation that has an in-built faultline by virtue of its 
composition, which merits both scholars’ and practitioners’ attention.    
Task-related attributes 
In the team effectiveness literature, scholars frequently distinguish between observable, 
social category, or surface-level characteristics on the one hand, and underlying, less visible, or 
deep-level characteristics on the other (e.g., Harrison, Price and Bell, 1998; Harrison, Price, 
Gavin and Florey, 2002; Jackson, Joshi and Erhardt, 2003; Milliken and Martins, 1996). The 
former group encompasses attributes such as age, gender, nationality, or racio-ethnicity, whereas 
the latter group comprises characteristics such as values, experience, and skills. According to the 
diversity literature, surface- and deep-level characteristics are differentially salient for group 
cohesiveness over time because time neutralizes the effects of surface-level characteristics and 
enhances the impact of deep-level attributes (Harrison et al., 1998; Harrison et al., 2002). 
Another similarly demarcated distinction in the literature is offered by Pelled (1996), who 
differentiated between highly job-related and less job-related attributes, whereby job relatedness 
is the degree to which the attribute captures experiences, skills or perspectives pertinent to 
cognitive work tasks. Job-relatedness is theoretically important because it describes the extent to 
which the attributes increase the task-related knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) that 
facilitate team performance. Task-relevant attributes such as functional background, education, 
or tenure as opposed to less task-related characteristics such as age, gender or racio-ethnicity are 
therefore assumed to have a stronger impact on group processes and performance (Pelled, 1996; 
Pelled, Eisenhardt and Xin, 1999). Differences in job-related attributes are also more likely to 
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surface in debate and become salient in work situations than less job-related characteristics (e.g., 
Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Jehn, Northcraft and Neale, 1999). This is the first reason for which 
we selected task-related attributes as a basis for studying board faultlines.  
The second reason behind this choice deals with the problem of faultline activation. Rather 
like their earthly counterparts, group faultlines can exist and yet remain dormant when 
differences in group members’ attributes are not perceived by group members. In order for the 
faultlines to erupt a trigger is needed, such as an event that activates them (Chrobot-Mason, 
Ruderman, Weber, and Ernst, 2009; Jehn and Bezrukova, 2010; Pearsall Ellis, and Evans, 2008). 
Polzer, Crisp, Jarvenpaa and Kim (2006) explain that whether faultlines remain dormant or 
become psychologically activated depends on whether features of the context in which a group 
operates highlight it (cf. Chrobot-Mason et al., 2009). For example, Lau and Murnighan (1998) 
indicated that retirement and pension problems may activate faultlines based on age, or 
affirmative-action topics may activate faultlines based on race. Moreover, a single, salient 
attribute may be sufficient to activate a faultline, such as parent company affiliations in joint 
ventures (Li and Hambrick, 2005), or nationality in transnational teams that meet face-to-face 
(Earley and Mosakowski, 2000). Accordingly, in the case of a board, factors such as whether one 
is a NED or ED (legal), how long one has been on the board (contractual), and the economic 
context in which one is working (formal), are commonly perceived by board members, and 
therefore faultlines based on such task-related attributes are likely to be more easily activated.  
 The extant faultline literature reports that group faultlines are typically related with 
increased intra-team conflict, lower group cohesion and therefore group process losses, which 
lead to decreased group performance (e.g., Li and Hambrick, 2005). However, most of these 
findings are drawn from research on student teams and experimental settings (e.g., Bezrukova et 
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al., 2009; Bezrukova et al., 2007; Homan Hollenbeck, Humphrey, Van Knippenberg, Ilgen, and 
Van Kleef, 2008; Molleman, 2005; Pearsall et al., 2008; Rico, Molleman, Sánchez-Manzanares 
and Van der Vegt, 2007; Sawyer, Houlette and Yeagley, 2006). Only recently has the concept of 
faultlines been applied to the studies of a firm’s upper echelons. For example, Barkema and 
Shvyrkov (2007) demonstrated that strong faultlines on the TMT are negatively related with the 
likelihood of a firm’s entry into a new geographic area, which is a decision that by its nature 
requires the consensus of most if not all TMT members. Minichilli et al. (2010) reported that 
strong factions of family and non-family members on the TMT hurt firm performance. Finally, 
Tuggle, Schnatterly and Johnson (2010) showed that strong faultlines on a board are negatively 
related with the proportion of time that it devotes to the discussion of entrepreneurial issues and 
that the degree of meeting informality is likely to ameliorate this negative relationship to some 
extent. Overall, there is still a dearth of research that examines the nature and impact of faultlines 
in a firm’s upper echelons, and boards of directors in particular. 
HYPOTHESISING THE POTENTIAL FOR BOARD SCHISM 
Board functions  
 Combining agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama and Jensen, 1983) and resource-
dependency theory (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), Hillman and Dalziel (2003) 
proposed a succinct model of board roles in which they distinguished the board monitoring and 
resource provision function. The first role is enacted through activities such as monitoring the 
CEO, monitoring strategy implementation, planning CEO succession, and evaluating and 
rewarding the CEO/top managers of the firm. The common denominator of all these activities is 
the obligation for the board to ensure that management operates in line with the shareholders’ 
interests. The provision of resources function, in turn, comprises activities such as providing 
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legitimacy and bolstering the public image of the firm, providing expertise (including the 
provision of internal firm information by inside directors), administering advice and counsel, 
linking the firm to important stakeholders, facilitating access to resources such as capital, and 
aiding in the formulation of strategy or other important firm decisions. The theoretical tie for all 
these activities is the focus on the board as a provider of resources rather than as an evaluator of 
management. Hillman and Dalziel (2003) note that the variety of board functions on top of the 
monitoring/ control role that are distinguished in the alternative prior typologies, such as strategy 
and service (Zahra and Pearce, 1989) or service and resource dependency (Johnson, Daily, and 
Ellstrand, 1996), are indicative of the array of board resources originally theorized by Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978) and therefore can be subsumed under their provision of resources role. Hillman 
and Dalziel (2003) further argue that the board capital, i.e. directors’ knowledge, skills and 
experiences (human capital) as well as their professional networks (social capital), underpins the 
board’s ability to perform its functions of monitoring and provision of resources effectively. At 
the same time they contend that board incentives, such as EDs’ compensation packages, 
moderate the relationship between board capital and effectiveness.  
Boardroom identities and faultlines 
 McNulty, Roberts and Stiles (2005) illustrated that board effectiveness hinges upon both 
the ability of directors as well as their motivation to become engaged. Expanding on the latter 
aspect, Hillman, Nicholson and Shropshire (2008) proposed a model in which they explain how 
directors’ identification with the organization, being a director, being the CEO, shareholders, 




 Any individual has many different identities that vary in salience and importance (Crisp 
and Hewstone, 2007). Ashforth and Mael (1989: 29) refer to this phenomenon as ‘an amalgam of 
identities’. Identity theory (Burke, 1980; Stryker, 1980) proposes that individuals are a collection 
of identities resulting from their multiple roles in society, such as being a CEO or a Chairperson 
in the context of the board. Each individual can be said to have an identity for each of the roles 
she/he plays within society and these identities provide meaning for the self because they  relate 
specific behavioural expectations with each role and distinguish roles from one another (Hogg, 
Terry and White, 1995). In similar vein, social identity theory (Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Tajfel, 
1974) views social categories such as nationality, education and profession, as ‘sources’ of 
identities for an individual. Each social group to which an individual belongs provides a 
definition of self based on the attributes of the given social group, which underpins her/his self-
esteem (Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Hogg and Terry, 2000). Whilst identity theory discusses the 
relationship between individuals and their behaviour as role based, social identity concentrates 
on the norms and stereotypes of social group membership as influencing behaviour (Hogg et al., 
1995). Moreover, social identification as a perception of oneness within a group and stemming 
from the categorisation of individuals underpins organizational identification, which impacts on 
the satisfaction of the individual with her/his role in an organization and the effectiveness of the 
organization (Ashforth and Mael, 1989).  
 Integrating identity and social identity theory, one can therefore say that identification 
with a role or social identity underpins the salience of that particular identity to the individual 
and the extent to which the identity will affect behaviour in an organization. Hillman et al. 
(2008) argue that if multiple identities compete with one another, identity multiplicity can be 
costly because it detracts from the individual’s behaviour toward the organization. Therefore, 
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they propose that the alignment between context-relevant identities is critical to understanding 
individual behaviour in any context, such as role execution in the boardroom (cf. Ashforth and 
Mael, 1989).  
 Given that UK corporate board composition bears the features of a team with pre-existing 
faultlines and that directors hold multiple identities based on the roles they perform and social 
groups to which they belong, there is a great likelihood that when sub-groups emerge that are 
homogenous in terms of task-related attributes, a conflict of identities may also arise between 
them. Chrobot-Mason et al. (2009) emphasise that increased salience of sub-group identities 
makes power struggles and conflict among sub-groups more likely to ensue. Strong faultlines 
provide even greater likelihood for work groups to polarize, which highlights the importance of 
attributes and magnifies the effects of external forces. This is because the processes of social 
categorization are at the root of such splits which lead to in-group favouritism and out-group 
discrimination (Haslam, 2004). Moreover, in case of board faultlines, there is strong awareness 
of the salient out-group, which underscores the existence of these boundaries and causes subjects 
to assume even greater in-group homogeneity. As a result, identification with sub-groups 
becomes more salient for board members than identification with the board as a whole to the 
detriment of the cohesiveness of the board (Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Hogg and Terry, 2000).  
Thus we consider four task-related characteristics. The first two attributes reflect 
identities associated with directors’ role in the boardroom, i.e. whether they are NEDs or EDs 
(type of directorship) and how long they have performed any role on a given board (board 
tenure). The remaining two task-related attributes underline directors’ social identities, i.e. being 
educated at a certain level such as Master or PhD (education level) and whether or not they are 
specialists in the area of finance (financial background). Operationalisations of faultlines in 
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studies of upper echelons have also typically been based on task-related attributes: Barkema and 
Shvyrkov (2007) used both education level and team tenure, whereas Tuggle et al. (2010) used 
board tenure in the calculation of faultlines. Inclusion of the type of directorship (NEDs and 
EDs) is justified by the fact that this is where the formal, legal and contractual distinction is 
drawn in unitary boards. Finally, we also incorporated the variable of board members’ financial 
background, as financial literacy and expertise is increasingly recognized as a very important if 
not key skill of board candidates in the wake of financial crisis that started in 2008 and growing 
financialisation of the economy (Davis, 2009; Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2009; Walker Review, 
2009). In view of considerable regulatory change and reform to international accounting 
standards, auditing and reporting requirements, financial literacy and expertise creates a 
knowledge frontier between those with and without financial background, which is likely to give 
rise to faultlines similar to directors’ other task-related attributes.  
Performance implications of board faultlines 
 When splits into sub-groups of NEDs and EDs with different average board tenure, 
education level, and degree of of financial background can be distinguished on a board, such 
faultlines are likely to be activated because they are context-relevant (Chrobot-Mason, 2009; 
Polzer et al, 2006). This particular alignment of task-related characteristics involves an interplay 
of identities. As exemplified in this case, the faultline means that there are different groupings on 
the board, with similar identities within each sub-group, which are however different between 
the sub-groups. For example, the identity of being a NED who has been appointed recently, is 
educated at the Master level and possesses financial qualification, is distinctly different to the 
identity of being a long-tenured ED who is educated at the Bachelor level and does not have 
financial qualification. The distinct sub-group identities resulting from the directors’ mandate in 
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the company, education, tenure on the board and the possession or lack of financial background 
become more salient than the identification with the board as a whole. Moreover, this conflicting 
interplay of sub-group identities based on task-relevant attributes is also likely to affect the board 
members’ strength of identification with the company as such, or its board, or CEO or with being 
a director, or with shareholders. For example, NEDs’ strength of identification with the company 
and the board may weaken, when they notice that their contribution is not recognized, whereas 
EDs being present at the company premises daily may exhibit greater identification with the 
CEO rather with than being a director and shareholders. In similar vein, long tenured directors 
may be withholding information from newcomers, which adversely affects the identification of 
the latter with their role as directors and the entire board. As a result, the boardroom dynamics 
resulting from this interplay of identities due to faultlines are likely to impair the board 
members’ ability and motivation of performing functions of monitoring and provision of 
resources (Hillman et al., 2008). The effectiveness of board task performance ultimately has 
impact on the firm’s internal and external value creation (Huse, 2005; Huse, 2007). Therefore, 
we hypothesise that such board task-related faultlines are likely to have value-destroying 
implications for the company (Li and Hambrick, 2005; Minichilli et al., 2010; cf. Tuggle et al, 
2010).   
H1: The board task-related faultlines will exhibit a negative relationship with firm financial 
performance. 
Exacerbation of board faultline effects  
 Scholars have highlighted the need to study variables that serve as proxies for group 
dynamics such as diversity and faultlines in a context, where other phenomena constitute 
mediating and moderating variables, so that potential contingencies and their impact can be 
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accurately captured (e.g., Bezrukova et al., 2007; Bezrukova et al., 2009; Joshi and Roh, 2009; 
Williams and O’Reilly, 1998). Task-related faultlines are context-relevant, but are also likely to 
be context-dependent, therefore we sought to examine a set of board contingency variables that 
are likely to impact on the faultline and performance relationship. First, we consider two 
measures which can magnify the negative impact of board schisms on value creation: (1) the 
condition of a busy board, and (2) the CEO’s tenure.  
Busyness of directors represents a condition in which directors have many external board 
appointments, known as ‘overboarded directors’ (Harris and Shimizu, 2004) which is likely to 
compromise their management attention and as a result, adversely affect their ability to devote 
sufficient time to the board duties in the focal company. Interestingly, the literature on board 
busyness demonstrates that these detrimental effects do not take place when average busyness of 
particular directors is considered (Ferris, Murali and Pritchard, 2003; Harris and Shimizu, 2004). 
However, when busy directors constitute at least half of the board, considerable negative 
performance effects are reported. At issue here is the distribution of board seats held by NEDs, in 
particular, who typically have many more external directorships than EDs. Therefore, the 
condition of the busy board, where the majority of directors are busy, rests on the assumption of 
the critical mass required for the phenomenon of busyness to be problematic for the board as a 
whole (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). Accordingly, in this study we consider the latter case, when 
busy NEDs constitute at least half of the board and refer to this as the condition of a busy board.  
Directors holding multiple board seats have a greater ‘amalgam of identities’ related to all 
companies in which they are board members, which is likely to weaken their identification with 
the focal company. Therefore, when boards characterized by faultlines based on the non-
executive and executive mandate on the board, education, board tenure and the degree of 
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financial specialism are affected by the condition of a busy board, the negative effects of these 
divisions are likely to be even more pronounced compared with boards with similar faultlines but 
where the majority of directors are not busy. This is because the limited time commitment and 
attention that directors on a busy board are able and willing to devote to the matters of the focal 
company board are likely to increase the salience of divisions based on task-related attributes and 
the underlying conflicting identities in perception of the sub-group members will be enhanced. 
Such course of events is therefore additionally detrimental for the cohesiveness and 
communication on the board as a whole. Therefore, we hypothesise: 
H2: The relationship between the board task-related faultlines and firm financial performance 
will be negatively moderated by the condition of a busy board.  
 Long CEO tenure is traditionally recognized as a source of expert power that is based on 
increased familiarity with the firm’s resources and methods of operation (e.g., Alderfer, 1986; 
Singh and Harianto, 1989; Finkelstein, 1992). Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989:124) observed 
that CEOs with long tenure may acquire a ‘personal mystique or patriarchy’, which typically 
results in sanctions against those questioning the CEO’s authority. Finally, the relatively longer 
CEO tenure compared to other board members can be also seen as an indicator of CEO power in 
relation to NEDs and the potential for her/his entrenchment in this position in the company, with 
implications for board conduct and performance (Westphal and Zajac, 1995).  
Accordingly, long-tenured CEOs are likely to have strong identification with the CEO  
role which is not necessarily aligned with the identification with the company and its board as 
such, around which the mandate of NEDs is typically constructed (Hillman et al., 2008). Boards 
with such a powerful CEO who is strongly identifying with her/his role are therefore likely to 
experience even more profound effects of task-related splits compared to boards with similar 
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faultlines but with the CEOs with the shorter tenure. This is because the salience of underlying 
sub-group conflicting identities is going to be magnified, strengthening the negative social 
categorization processes of in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination and fuelling the 
biased inter-group comparisons. Ultimately, communication and cohesiveness on the board as a 
whole will be adversely affected, with more pronounced value-destroying implications.  
H3: The relationship between the board task-related faultlines and firm financial performance 
will be negatively moderated by the CEO tenure.  
Amelioration of board faultline effects  
 In as much as there are factors that can enhance board polarization due to faultlines, there 
are also elements of board structure and incentives that can serve as in-built potential corrective 
mechanisms for board schisms. We consider two such factors: (1) EDs’ compensation structure, 
and (2) the proportion of NEDs involved in the work of the board committees.  
 The EDs’ performance-related pay component is geared towards aligning the EDs’ 
interest with the long-term interest of the company’s shareholders, which NEDs are supposed to 
represent. In line with the predictions of agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama and Jensen, 
1983), there is an incentive for the otherwise self-interested agents (i.e. EDs) to behave more like 
shareholder stewards of the company who proritise the long-term sustainability of the company. 
For example, Westphal (1999) showed that greater CEO incentive alignment positively impacts 
on the relationship between CEO-board friendship ties and board involvement in advice and 
counsel on strategic issues. Regarding faultlines specifically, Homan et al. (2008) demonstrated 
that the design of the reward structure in diverse teams may reduce the negative consequences of 
the faultlines, when the reward structure cuts through the categories (cross-categorisation) or 
accentuates the super-ordinate group identity (recategorisation). A greater performance-related 
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pay component in executive remuneration is therefore likely to strengthen EDs’ identification 
with the company, its board as a whole and shareholders and make it converge with the 
identification that is expected of NEDs by virtue of their mandate in companies.  
This cross-cutting and recategorising mechanism echoes arguments from social identity 
literature in which there are recommendations for it as a means of reducing biased inter-group 
comparisons and the salience of sub-group conflicting identities which underpin the rivalry 
between them (Ashorth and Mael, 1989; Hogg and Terry, 2000). EDs’ compensation structure 
with its substantial performance-related component enhances the goal commonality among 
directors, which cross-cuts the boundaries of faultlines based on task-related attributes and is 
likely to make the effects of the process of negative social categorization in terms of in-group 
favouritism and out-group discrimination milder. As a result, the negative effects of such 
divisions on boards underpinned by conflicting identities are likely to be less pronounced on 
boards of companies whose EDs’ pay is substantially tied to performance compared to those 
companies with similar faultlines, in which fixed salary represents the main component of their 
EDs’ compensation structure.  
H4: The relationship between the board task-related faultlines and firm financial performance 
will be positively moderated by the EDs’ performance-related pay ratio. 
 Consistent with its predecessors (i.e. all iterations of the Combined Code since 1998), the 
UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) recommends the establishment, composition and roles 
of three specific board committees to the UK listed companies, i.e. audit, nomination and 
remuneration committee. The academic literature on the antecedents and consequences of the 
existence, composition and process of board committees is growing (e.g., Conyon and Peck, 
1998; Ruigrok, Peck, Tacheva, Greve and Hu, 2006). In this study, we consider the NEDs’ 
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involvement in sub-committee work as a potential moderator of the board task-related faultlines 
and firm financial performance relationship, because it gives NEDs additional role identities of 
being e.g. nomination committee Chairperson or audit committee member. 
Such sub-committee roles are likely to strengthen directors’ identification with the 
company as such, its board, and their being a director. In addition, they create an opportunity for 
additional meetings and therefore socialization amongst board members, which is recommended 
in social identity literature as a means of reducing biased inter-group comparisons as well as in-
group favouritism and out-group discrimination based on underlying identities (Ashorth and 
Mael, 1989; Hogg and Terry, 2000). Moreover, they confer additional and topic-specific 
responsibilities on sub-committee members with regard to CEO succession, executive 
remuneration, or internal control, and situate directors in various personal configurations with 
different lines of reporting and responsibility. Therefore, the boundaries of task-related faultlines 
on the board are likely to be permeated by sub-committee composition and work. This may 
reduce the salience of conflicting sub-group identities and make the negative effects of splits less 
pronounced in companies where NEDs are on average greatly involved in the sub-committee 
work, compared to companies with similar faultlines but where this level of involvement is 
lower. 
 H5: The relationship between the board task-related faultlines and firm financial performance 
will be positively moderated by the average proportion of NEDs present on board committees.  
METHODS 
Dataset 
 The sample consists of an unbalanced panel data set of UK companies that constituted the 
Financial Times and London Stock Exchange (FTSE) 350 Index as of financial year-end 2008, 
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across the 1999-2008 period. The unbalanced data structure is common in longitudinal studies as 
firms/directors enter and exit into/from the market/firms across years. The FTSE 350 Index 
comprises constituents of the widely-known FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 indices, representing 
approximately 80% and 18%, respectively, of the market capitalisation in the UK economy 
(Belaire-Franch and Opong, 2005). Our sample is therefore a fair representation of the UK’s 
largest stock-exchange listed companies across this decade, for which the impact of board 
faultlines on firm performace can be examined. Director information was derived from BoardEx, 
whilst financial performance of firms, firm and industry characteristics were derived from 
multiple sources: Thompson One Banker, World Scope, Fame UK, and Office for National 
Statistics (ONS). Due to missing information on various variables (see total number of 
observations in Table 1), the number of cross-sectional units varies between 263 firms in Model 
1, 229 firms in Model 2, and 216 firms in Model 3 as presented in Table 2.   
Measures 
Firm Performance. In order to test the hypotheses derived in the preceding theoretical 
section, we use the Tobin’s q measure of firm performance. Stock-based measures of 
performance are commonly used in existing literature. (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Demsetz and 
Lehn, 1985; Guest, 2009) and capture the external response to organizational actions. Whilst 
accounting based measures are generally associated with the past internal efficiency of a firm, 
market-based measures reflect investor perceptions of the firm’s past, current, and future stock 
returns. Board composition and actions are important for the firm’s reputation in financial 
markets, so board proceedings have generally greater impact for stock-based than for 
accounting-based measures of firm performance (Haslam, Ryan, Kulich, Trojanowski and 
Atkins, 2010; cf. Oxelheim and Randøy, 2003). Therefore, we use Tobin’s q as a measure of firm 
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financial performance, which is a proxy estimate of investor perceptions and confidence as to 
how efficiently firms make use of their assets (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003) and an 
indicator of how effective corporate governance mechanisms of firms are. We define Tobins’q as 
the ratio of the firm’s market value to its book value. The firm's market value is calculated as the 
book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity (De Andres 
and Vallelado, 2008).  
 Faultline Index. Our measure of the faultline index consists of four task-related 
characteristics (the type of directorship, education level, board tenure, and financial background 
of board members). Type of directorship is coded as either NED or ED. Education is measured 
according to the scale of educational achievements, which are coded as follows: 1-
School/Vocational, 2-Bachelor, 3-Master, 4-Master of Business Administration (MBA), and 5-
Doctor, to rank order the educational degrees. Board tenure is captured as the length of time that 
each member has served on a board in a given company. Financial background of board 
members is coded as 1 if members hold financial qualifications from higher educational 
institutions or professional bodies and as 0 otherwise.  
Following Thacher, Jehn and Zanutto (2003) and Bezrukova et al (2009), we measure the 
faultline strength, gFau , that is how a group splits into sub-groups. 
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where ijkX represents the value of the 
thj task related characteristic of the thi  member of sub-
group k ,  jX  is the overall group mean of characteristic j , jkX  is the mean of characteristic j in 
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sub-group k, gkn is the number of members of the 
thk  sub-group (k=1,2) under split g. We 
consider only group splits in which the size of each sub-group k has at minimum two members. 
gFau  takes values between 0 and 1, with a maximum value of 1 when the two sub-groups are 
perfectly homogenous internally. 
 The faultline distance gD below measures how far apart the two sub-groups are from 
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This is measured as a distance between vectors of means of each variable for sub-group 
1= ).....,,.........,,( 1131211 PXXXX  , and for sub-group 2= ).....,,.........,,( 2232221 PXXXX  . The 
value of a faultline distance ranges between 0 and infinity, with larger values representing a 
larger distance between sub-groups 1 and 2.  
 Ultimately, the overall faultline index is calculated as an interaction between the faultline 
strength (1) and distance (2). The advantage of using the faultline index as devised by Thatcher 
et al. (2003) is that multiple characteristics of board members are taken into account 
simultaneously by measuring scores for both continuous and categorical variables. This measure 
also captures the entire continuum of faultline values, which is a significant improvement over 
measures applied in other studies of faultlines in a firm’s upper echelons. This stands in contrast 
to  Barkema and Shvyrkov (2007) and Tuggle et al. (2010) who used the 2-step methodology 
based on the method suggested in the seminal paper by Lau and Murnighan (1998), which 
involves visual inspection as a way of assessment of the faultline strength and typically limits 
faultline scores to strong and weak faultline settings. This is also an advancement on Minichilli 
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et al. (2010) who applied the mere ratio of family members on the TMT as a measure of 
faultlines.    
Control Variables. Building on the extant literature, we include various corporate 
governance, firm, and industry characteristics as control variables. The first set of variables 
focuses on governance dimensions: board size, CEO/Chair Separation, and CEO Ownership. 
Board size captures the capacity for effectiveness of the fulfilment of board functions, measured 
as the total number of EDs and NEDs on the board (Guest, 2009). Prior literature acknowledges 
that the type of board leadership and the role of CEO can influence firm performance. 
CEO/Chair separation is coded as a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the CEO and 
Chairperson roles are separated, and 0 if both roles are performed by the same individual (e.g., 
Datta, Musteen and Herrmann, 2009). CEO ownership is operationalised as the value of equity 
held by the CEO. The amount of equity held by the CEO represents a proxy for an effective 
mechanism of aligning the incentives of managers with the performance targets expected by 
shareholders (Fich and White, 2005). All corporate governance variables are lagged for one 
period to safeguard from the potential of reverse causality.  
The second set of variables refers to firm characteristics: firm size, firm age, and firm 
diversification, which are defined as total sales (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006), the number of years 
since the firm was established as an economic entity (Guest, 2009), and the number of business 
segments in which the firm is active classified according to the two-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Linck, Netter and Yang, 2008; Martin and 
Sayrak, 2003), respectively.  
The final set of variables focuses on industry characteristics. We control for two heavily 
regulated sectors (1) financial services (SIC, edition 87: 60-64 and 67), and (2) utilities (SIC, 87: 
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48-49) coded as dummy variables since government regulations of these sectors might influence 
the firm financial performance (cf. Minichilli, Zattoni and Zona, 2009). We also include the year 
dummy variables for our sampling period to capture any macroeconomic effects (i.e. financial 
crisis, changes in the regulatory framework and accounting standards) that may affect our 
analysis. 
Moderating Variables. In order to examine moderating impacts on the relationship 
between the faultline index and firm performance, we include as moderating variables the 
following: (1) the measure of busy boards, (2) the CEO tenure, (3) the reward structure of EDs, 
and (4) the average number of NEDs on board committees as a proportion of all NEDs on the 
board. The condition of a busy board is captured as a dummy variable, coded as 1 if NEDs 
holding three or more directorates constitute at least half of the board, and 0 otherwise (Fich and 
Shivdasani, 2006). We measured the CEO tenure as the number of years during which the 
current CEO served in the role in the focal firm (McKnight and Weir, 2009). We accounted for 
the reward structure of EDs as the average proportion of all performance-related pay to the total 
compensation (cf. Westphal, 1999). Finally, we took an average number of NEDs sitting on all 
board sub-committees, i.e. audit, nomination and remuneration (as per UK regulation), and 
divided it by the overall number of NEDs on the entire board (cf. Zhang, 2008).   
Econometric Analysis 
 The methodology of linear mixed-effect models is used for modelling the data set with 
firms’ effects being defined as random. One of the advantages of a mixed-effect model over a 
simple fixed-effect model is that it allows for detecting both correlations within the firm level 
and heterogeneous variances (Littell, Milliken, Stroup, and Wolfinger, 1996). A mixed-effects 
model includes additional random-effect terms to take account of unobserved firm specific 
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heterogeneity and the covariance structure of the data, allowing each firm to have its own 
intercept and slope. We are also interested in the marginal contribution of interaction terms over 
any variance explained by the main effects, so a hierarchical linear approach is more appropriate 
to handle moderators effectively (Chiu and Sharfman, forthcoming; Kim, Al-Shammar, Kim, and 
Lee, 2009). In order to adjust for inflation, all monetary values (firm performance, firm size, 
executive remuneration) are converted to real terms (according to 2005 prices) using industry 
level (SIC, edition 1992) output deflators for non-manufacturing and Producer Price Index (PPI) 
for manufacturing firms. For regression analysis, all variables except for the dummy coded ones 
are transformed into natural logarithms and the value “1” is added where variables are less than 0. 
Our estimated parameters are therefore interpreted as the elasticities. To take account of the 
potential multicollinearity issue, independent variables used to construct two-way interaction 
terms for testing the moderating effects are mean centred. 
RESULTS 
 The means, standard deviations, and correlation matrix of variables used in the analysis 
are presented in Table 1. All variables are expressed in the actual level form rather than as 
centered values to simplify interpretation.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
 
The sample mean of the faultline index is 2.55, indicating that the divisions on the board of the 
largest UK companies in terms of task-related attributes across the 1999-2008 period are large. 
Table 2 presents the statistical estimates of a linear mixed-effects model to evaluate both the 
main and moderating effects of the board faultline index on firm performance.  
-------------------------------- 




Model 1 contains only control variables and explains 20 per cent of the variance (F = 16.84; p < 
0.001). Among those control variables, we find that the coefficient of CEO ownership is 
significantly different from zero with a positive sign (   = 0.06, p < 0.001). This is in line with 
the extant corporate governance literature which indicates that the amount of equity held by a 
CEO has a positive impact on financial performance (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). Firm size is 
statistically significant and negatively associated with firm performance (   = - 0.06, p < 0.001), 
suggesting that larger firms are likely to have lower market valuation. Model 2 adds a faultline 
index variable to assess Hypothesis 1 and explains 22 per cent of the variance (F = 17.7; p < 
0.001). As predicted, the faultline index is statistically significant and negatively correlated with 
the market value of firms (   = - 0.14, p < 0.001). Thus, this result strongly supports Hypothesis 
1. The coefficients of CEO tenure (   = 0.03, p < 0.05) and firm age (   = - 0.02, p < 0.05) 
become statistically significant when the faultline index variable is added in model 2. Whilst 
CEO tenure is positively associated with firm performance, the maturity of firms has a negative 
impact on the market perceptions. Model 3 provides the result of augmented regression analysis 
by including two-way interactive terms between the faultline index and moderating variables 
described in the preceding section to test Hypotheses 2, 3, 4 and 5. The explanatory power of 
model 3 accounts for 27 per cent of the variance (F = 15.62; p < 0.001). As in model 2, the 
faultline index is significantly different from zero and a negative predictor of investor confidence 
(   = - 0.50, p < 0.001). A two-way interaction term between the faultline index and busy boards 
is significant at 10 percent level and negative as predicted (   = - 0.17, p < 0.10), therefore 
Hypothesis 2 is supported. The moderating impact of the CEO tenure on the relationship 
between the faultline index and firm value is statistically significant and negative (   = - 0.09, p 
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< 0.001), so Hypothesis 3 is also supported. The coefficient of the interaction terms between the 
faultline index and compensation structure is positive and highly significant (   = 0.08, p < 
0.001). This suggests that the reward structure of EDs positively moderates the relationship 
between board faultlines and firm performance. Thus, the result supports Hypothesis 4. The 
interaction term between the faultline index and the average number of NEDs on board 
committees as a proportion of all NEDs on the board is not statistically significant. Hence, 
Hypothesis 5 is not supported.  
DISCUSSION 
Our results reveal that the task-related faultlines based on the type of directorship, board 
tenure, education level and financial background of board members are substantial on the UK 
boards and are strongly, negatively correlated with financial performance. Faultlines in task-
related attributes are context-relevant and given the type of decisions that boards generally make, 
e.g. approving of strategy plans, executive remuneration,., they are likely to be easily activated 
(Chrobot-Mason et al., 2009; Polzer et al., 2006; Tuggle et al., 2010).  
Faultlines also imply an interplay of identities, which are homogenous within sub-groups 
but differ between subgroups, such as a role of a part-time NED with a 6-year long tenure, 
educated to the doctorate level without any financial qualification versus a role of a full-time 
CEO or Finance Director with a 1-year tenure on the board, educated to the Master level and in 
possession of financial specialism. The evidence that we generate based on the baseline 
hypothesis provides validation of findings from the extant faultline literature based on student 
teams and experimental settings (e.g., Bezrukova et al., 2009; Homan et al., 2008; Molleman, 
2005) as well as faultline studies on a firm’s upper echelons (Barkema and Shvyrkov, 2007; 
Minichilli et al., 2010; Tuggle et al., 2010 in the novel, non-experimental context of UK 
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corporate boards over time. In this setting of UK boards, we find that faultlines are likely to 
reduce board functionality in terms of monitoring and resource-provision, which has negative 
implications for a firm’s value-creation.  
Our contribution extends further to the analysis of moderators, i.e. factors that can either 
exacerbate or ameliorate the negative faultline effects. The augmented model showed that when 
NEDs holding multiple external board seats constitute the majority of a board, the negative board 
faultline effects can be more pronounced compared to boards characterised by similar faultlines 
but not affected by the condition of a busy board. This is because the identification with as well 
as time commitment and attention that such directors are able to devote to the matters of the 
focal company board are compromised, which amplifies divisions based on task-related 
attributes. The severity of this problem rests in the fact that the busyness condition encompasses 
the critical mass of board members. The second board characteristic that magnifies negative 
faultline effects is a long CEO tenure. Strong identification of the CEO with her/his role is likely 
to enhance the salience of conflicting sub-group identities due to task-related faultlines which 
leads to strengthening of negative social categorisation processes. As a result, the conflict of 
identities and asymmetry in the strength of identification with the company and its board on the 
one hand, and the CEO on the other, is likely to magnify board dysfunctionality and have further 
negative performance implications.  
At the oppositie end of the spectrum, we found strong evidence that in line with the 
predictions of the agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama and Jensen, 1983), the incentive 
alignment of EDs can have a beneficial impact on the behaviour of EDs and ultimately board 
cohesiveness. We detect this effect through the positive and corrective impact of ED’s pay 
contingency on the boardroom divisions as captured with the measure of faultlines. Arguably, 
Board Faultlines 
 29 
such a reward structure represents a cross-categorising and/ or recategorising mechanism across 
sub-groups of NEDs and EDs that are characterized by different board tenure, education and 
degree of financial specialism (Hogg and Terry, 2000; Homan et al., 2008) and engenders 
incentives for EDs to increase collaboration with NEDs in the boardroom (Westphal, 1999). 
Finally, we did not find evidence to support the assertion that greater average involvement of 
NEDs in board committee work positively moderates the relationship between task-related 
faultlines and firm financial performance. One conceivable reason for this finding may be that 
although board committee work creates an opportunity for additional meetings and socialization 
with other board members, it does not fully serve the purpose of counter-balancing the original 
perceptions of salient conflicting sub-group identities by board members formed through the 
proceedings of the entire board.  
Overall, our findings provide additional evidence of the negative consequences of 
faultlines to the repository of faultline empirical literature in an almost unexplored context of 
boards of directors (except for Tuggle et al., 2010). This study also contributes to the corporate 
governance literature by demonstrating how the concept of faultlines from the group 
effectiveness literature can be utilized as a tool for better understanding the likely board 
dynamics based on the board composition. Finally, our results provide validation to agency 
theory with regard to incentive alignment, the tangible beneficial impact of which is reflected in 
improved board cohesiveness.  
Managerial implications 
 Our study underlines the fact that board composition matters for boardroom dynamics 
and ultimately the board’s ability to create value. Currently, there are calls for increasing board 
diversity: (1) Norway’s positive discrimination in favour of achieving 40% female board 
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membership, (2) the US Securities and Exchange Commission implementing a new rule obliging 
companies to disclose how they considered gender diversity when nominating directors; (3) UK 
government building on the Higgs Review provisions (2003, 10.15-10.33), the Tyson Review 
(2003) of board diversity, and the Davies Review (2011) of gender equality on corporate boards. 
In their seminal paper, Lau and Murnighan (1998) demonstrated that the emergence of faultlines 
implies a moderate amount of diversity, because both with no diversity and very high level of 
diversity, the alignment into homogeneous sub-groups is not possible. Therefore, one of the 
pitfalls in answering these calls of the regulator is that when diversity increases from the 
currently low level to moderate the likelihood of board schisms may increase, which, as we 
demonstrate, has negative value-creating implications. In this paper we considered faultlines 
based on task-related attributes, however faultlines can form based on social category 
characteristics and underlying social identities as well, such as age, gender, racio-ethnicity (e.g., 
Bezrukova et al., 2009). Nomination committees should be mindful of this danger and 
incorporate it as one of the relevant criteria in the director nomination and selection process.  
 This study shows that when there are potentially dysfunctional schisms on a board, the 
long CEO tenure and multiple external board appointments of the majority of NEDs are board 
characteristics that can be changed to improve board team performance. Similarly, an increased 
level of performance-related pay of EDs may reduce some of these divisive effects. These are 
arguably board characteristics that cannot be changed easily because perhaps the CEO is 
entrenched and powerful, there are not so many available NEDs that have fewer external board 
appointments than the incumbent directors, and because the company has a certain remuneration 
policy in place that has to be agreed with shareholders. However, when confronted with such 
board dysfunctionality, the board leadership should be aware that changing these factors, even if 
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it requires more effort and some more serious structural adjustments, may improve the board 
cohesiveness and functionality. Moreover, the beneficial impact of EDs’ compensation structure 
can be seen as a cross-cutting and recategorisation strategy to rememdy team splits (Chrobot-
Mason, Ruderman, Weber, Ohlott and Dalton, 2007). EDs’ compensation structure with a 
substantial performance-related pay component creates commonality of interest between sub-
groups of NEDs and EDs (cross-cutting) as well as accentuates the superordinate identity of the 
board associated with taking care of the long-term interest of the company and its shareholders 
(recategorisation). This is in line with the extant literature which shows that the recategorisation 
strategy can be a successful tool in ameliorating the negative consequences of faultlines (e.g., 
Homan et al., 2008; Jehn and Bezrukova, 2010). Finally, following Tuggle et al. (2010) who 
demonstrate that meeting informality decreases the salience of faultlines, it seems that informal 
meetings and conversations comprising board members crossing sub-group boundaries and 
creating an opportunity for additional socialization for board members may also be a viable 
strategy to follow in remedying board schism. 
Limitations and future research directions 
 We acknowledge the limitation of using the firm valuation as a dependent variable in this 
study. Arguably, board task effectiveness could be a more adequate measure to apply, instead 
(e.g., Huse, 2005; Minichilli, Zattoni and Zona, 2009). However, capturing the latter can be 
problematic as well, because it is typically achieved with some degree of subjective judgment 
based on the survey instrument. Moreover, sample size may also be further reduced by the 
common problem of low reponse rate. Finally, probably the main obstacle to using a survey-
based dependent variable in our study is that it would include a substantial longitudinal 
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dimension with data dating back as far as 1999, which makes it extremely difficult to get 
retrospective answers on board task effectiveness.  
 Secondly, in our selection of the task-related attributes we concentrated on financial 
expertise as an increasingly recognised and desired skill of board members (e.g., Jeanjean and 
Stolowy, 2009). In future research, there is potential to explore a full spectrum of functional 
backgrounds of directors, such as strategy, marketing, law and/ or industry experience. Inclusion 
of such fine-grained variables into the calculation of the measure of faultlines holds promise for 
an even more illuminating research and interesting findings.  
Another area of future research which could build on our findings would be to explore 
the extent to which they are generalizable in contexts other than the UK, where boards are 
comprised differently. For example, in some European countries, the two-tier board structure 
means that the higher, supervisory board comprises different representational directors, 
suggesting an underlying potential for faultlines to occur based on their different interest 
groupings. This would provide an interesting contrasting setting in which to explore the impact 
of faultlines on board outcomes and/or firm performance. 
Finally, a further interesting area of further research would be to explore in some depth, 
the micro-process variables which underpin and arise because of group schisms, such as task, 
emotional and group process conflict, intra-group communication as well as board task 
effectiveness. Ideally, this could be a complementary study, based on qualitative data from which 
to develop a micro-process analysis of the underlying potential for, process of, and consequences 
of board schism:  for example, what kinds of events, such as presentation of strategy by EDs, 
nomination of new directors, discussion over access to capital, are most likely to cause schisms 
to materialize. However, it should be noted that access to boards and the sensitivity of the topic 
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of board schisms may well be an issue (Leblanc and Schwartz, 2007; Pettigrew, 1992; Pye and 
Pettigrew, 2005). 
CONCLUSION 
 By developing the concept of faultlines from group effectiveness literature in to corporate 
governance research, we have sought to enhance our understanding of board dynamics and their 
consequences for board value-creation. Since there is a dearth of research that looks at the 
composition of a firm’s upper echelons from this perspective, we endeavoured to provide 
substantial empirical evidence of the UK’s largest firms over a ten year period. Moreover, we 
attempted to elucidate that faultlines can be an important tool in understanding board dynamics, 
especially in unitary boards where differently contracted directors, i.e. executive and non-
executive, work together.  
 Our findings demonstrate that faultlines are likely to be detrimental for boards of 
directors as much as they were found to be for student teams and in experimental settings  where 
most empirical studies of faultlines have been conducted. Several conditions and characteristics 
of boards can either exacerbate or ameliorate the negative consequences of faultlines. When 
faultlines occur on boards where the majority of directors hold multiple directorships at other 
companies, and on boards with the long-tenured CEO, their effects are likely to be even more 
adverse for board value-creation. The remedying impact potential of EDs’ pay highlights the 
tangible benefits of incentive alignment for facilitating more cohesion in the boardroom and in 
this analysis of faultlines, offers a different dimension to classic assumptions of agency theory.    
 The managerial implications arising from our study point to the importance of the 
director nomination processs, in which directors should be mindful that increasing diversity to 
the moderate level also considerably increases the risk of sub-group formation on boards. 
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Furthermore, the role of active leadership in ensuring board cohesiveness appears as crucial and 
our study opens up the agenda for more fine-grained research using the faultline concept 
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Means, Standard Deviations and a Full Correlation Matrix for All Variables across the years 1999-2008 
    Obs Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Board Size 2550 9.40 3.10 1.000             
2 CEO Ownership 2350 1031 2996 0.1509* 1.000            
3 CEO Tenure 2345 5.49 5.51 -0.0976* 0.017  1.000           
4 CEO Duality 2525 0.93 0.25 0.034  0.0691* -0.1760* 1.000          
5 Firm Size 3274 3703 12671 0.4205* 0.2023* -0.0779* 0.011  1.000         
6 Firm Age 3817 32.69 36.71 0.019  -0.030  -0.009  -0.018  0.0365* 1.000        
7 Number of Business Segments 3663 1.73 1.01 0.2275* 0.0423* -0.022  0.035  0.2209* 0.0630* 1.000       
8 Faultline Index 1938 2.55 1.92 0.021  -0.0611* 0.4435* -0.1345* -0.0614* 0.2031* 0.017  1.000      
9 Busy Board 2565 0.16 0.37 -0.0591* 0.0998* -0.1168* -0.001  0.0909* 0.0525* -0.021  -0.0916* 1.000     
10 EDs’ Compensation Structure 1748 0.45 0.19 0.1812* 0.4571* -0.0932* 0.022  0.1965* -0.021  0.022  -0.1383* 0.1274* 1.000    
11 NEDs on Board Committees 2542 0.75 0.26 -0.2914* -0.1207* 0.1039* 0.001  -0.1981* 0.028  0.018  0.1562* -0.2067* -0.1669* 1.000   
12 Tobin’s Q 3106 1.85 2.53 -0.032  0.1016* 0.039  -0.0664* -0.030  -0.0952* 0.018  -0.0497* -0.037  0.1692* 0.0434* 1.000  












Linear Mixed Effects Analysis for the Board Faultline Index and Firm Performance 
          
    Dependent Variable: Tobin's Q 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
    Coef. S.E.   Coef. S.E.   Coef.  S.E. 
Control Variables         
 Board Size -0.01 (0.05)  0.09† (0.05)  0.003 (0.06) 
 CEO Ownership 0.06*** (0.01)  0.06*** (0.01)  0.03** (0.01) 
 CEO Tenure 0.02† (0.01)  0.03** (0.01)    
 CEO Duality 0.03 (0.06)  0.03 (0.06)  0.03 (0.07) 
 Firm Size -0.06*** (0.01)  -0.08*** (0.01)  -0.08*** (0.01) 
 Firm Age -0.02† (0.01)  -0.02**  (0.01)  -0.01 (0.01) 
 Number of Business Segments 0.03 (0.04)  0.01 (0.04)  0.004 (0.04) 
Main Effects         
 Faultlines    -0.14*** (0.03)  -0.50*** (0.12) 
Moderating variables         
 Busy Board       0.26† (0.11) 
 CEO Tenure       0.13*** (0.04) 
 EDs’ Compensation Structure        -0.23 (0.18) 
 NEDs on Board Committees       -0.12 (0.12) 
Interaction Effects         
 Faultlines X Busy Board      -0.17† (0.10) 
 Faultlines X CEO Tenure       -0.09*** (0.03) 
 Faultlines X EDs’ Compensation Structure       0.09*** (0.02) 
 Faultlines X NEDs on Board Committees     0.14 (0.10) 
          
Constant 0.57*** (0.12)  0.75*** (0.14)  1.15*** (0.18) 
          
Number of Firms  263  229  216 
Number of Obs. 1584  1267  1100 
F 16.84***  17.70***  15.62*** 
R-Square 0.209  0.228  0.267 
Adjusted R-Square 0.197   0.215   0.250 
Sectoral (finance and utilities) and year dummy variables are included for all specifications. 
Models are specified with random effects.       
† p<.10         
* p<.05         
** p<.01         
*** p<.001 (All two tailed)         
 
 
 
 
 
 
